

Doc. 6444-G

昭和十年

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滿受大日記 (密)

陸軍省

(三冊、抜萃)

No. 1

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No. 3

文部省司長官 敬啟 文部省(昭和)

八月二十日(星期一) 茲有第七次(通算) 果統制
 策要綱(付關係官廳) 賜教之處 東亞等
 二項之資料 送付了。 茲將之(通算) 取計(二) 令
 令的態度(二) 送付了。 茲將之(通算) 取計(二) 令
 得(二) 送付了。 茲將之(通算) 取計(二) 令
 國主野司長官 敬啟 文部省(昭和)

昭和元年八月廿五日(昭)

Not used

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Page 1

Prisoner of War Information Bureau

Mar. 1, Shwun 17 /1942/

Secret Telegram Feb. 28

Dispatched 3.50 p.m.

Arrived 5.10 p.m.

CHO-SAN-DEW /Korean Army Staff Telegram/ No. 518

To the Vice-Minister /of War/ and the Deputy Chief of Staff

From the Chief of Staff of the Korean Army.

We beg your special consideration of the earnest desire of the Government-General and the Korean Army to intern in Korea British and American prisoners of war numbering 1,000 each, since it would be most effective in establishing a firm conviction of victory among the Korean people by sweeping from their minds the idea of worshipping England and America.

Furthermore, as far the buildings to be allotted for the camps, two seminaries in SEOUL; and a foreigners' school and a seminary in KEIJO can be allotted.

The concrete details concerning the internment will be sent after hearing the intentions of the authorities.

not used

Doc 651

秘 電 報 二、二八 一七、一〇 一七、三、一

朝鮮軍參謀長

次 官 宛
次 長

朝鮮軍參謀長

半島人ノ英米崇敬既念ヲ一掃シテ必勝ノ信念ヲ確
立セシムル爲メ頗ル有効ニシテ總督府及軍共ニ益
益シアルニ付、英米降参各千名ヲ朝鮮ニ收容セラ
レ度實ニ配慮ラレフ
是テ收容所ニ充當スベキ建場ハ京城府ノ神學校ニ
校 平壤府外人學校及神學校各一ヲ充當シ得ヘシ
詳細ハ收容ニ關スル中央ノ意向承リタル上具體的
ニ申報スベシ。

CONFIDENTIAL

October, 1938

Progress of the problem of the
Central Organ vis-a-vis China.

Investigation Dept. of
Foreign Ministry

(Report by YONEZAWA on April 20, 1938)

Progress of the Problem of the Central
Organ vis-a-vis China. (Part 1)

I. About Jan. 20 of this year, at a Board of Executives' meeting of the Third Committee of the Planning Board, the establishment of the East Asia Affairs Bureau (a provisional name) under the Prime Minister was unofficially proposed, and it was decided that the matter should be studied by each member. The gist of the draft was:-

1. In regard to relations with CHINA:

- (a) Drafting and execution of plans concerning economy in CHINA;
- (b) Maintenance of unity in the administrative duties concerning CHINA among all Government offices;
- (c) Supervision and control over the business of all the national-policy companies in CHINA;

2. In regard to relations with MANCHURIA:

All the business of the Manchurian Affairs Bureau;

3. In regard to relations between MANCHURIA and CHINA:

Business concerning cultural enterprises of the Foreign Ministry;

11 of which were to be placed under the jurisdiction of the said Bureau.

The draft is not only inexpedient because of its aiming at uniting the various functions under one body by making no difference between CHINA and MANCHURIA, but also gives rise to a discord in diplomacy because it

includes both the drafting and executing of plans on economic matters (economy and politics are actually inseparable) and cultural works under its (the Bureau's) jurisdiction.

Thereupon the Foreign Ministry firmly opposed the above plan and drew up the following alternative plan and tried hard to persuade the parties concerned in order to push through the said scheme. This latter plan, which calls for the establishing of a separate bureau to be placed under the control of the FOREIGN MINISTER in regard to matters relating to the exploitation of economy in CHINA, embodies

1. Investigation and planning.
2. Supervision and control of the business of national-policy companies.
3. Coordination and regulation of affairs among all Government offices.

II. However, as to the plan of the Foreign Ministry, the War Ministry, the Planning Board and the Finance Ministry all opposed it. The Navy, though it concurred with the reasoning of the Foreign Ministry, said that it was not suited as a counter measure for the situation of that time. Thus the view of establishing the said Bureau by the Cabinet /T.M. under the Prime Minister/ was most popular. About this time, in the Diet, too, the necessity of establishing a central organ for the purpose of settling the CHINA affair, was loudly advocated, and the Prime Minister replied to the effect that it would be realized before long, acknowledging the necessity. With the progress of negotiations regarding the main points for establishing national policy companies among the Ministries concerned, it was considered necessary that the above said matter regarding a Central Organ should be speedily decided, and finally it was arranged that the Bureau of Legislation should at any rate draw up a bill.

III. In course of time, at the end of February, the so-called draft of the Bureau of Legislation appeared in the papers, but the size of the planned structure was sufficiently big as to form an "East Asia Ministry" or a similar independent Ministry, so that on February 28, Investigation Dept. Chief YONEMURA called on Legislation Bureau Councillor HIGUCHI and on March 1, the East Asia Bureau Director ISHII, visited Legislation Bureau Director FUJIO for the purpose of sounding the views of the Bureau of Legislation, who opined that

1. The present condition of the Foreign Ministry (its organization and its actual personnel) is not suited to carry out the mission at this time of emergency.

2. The manner of settling the CHINA problem has a vital bearing upon the future welfare of the Empire. Therefore we should handle this matter with a united front by avoiding any petty squabbling over this or that Ministry's sphere of influence.
3. Therefore, the national policy, from a general standpoint, namely, of politics, diplomacy, economy, commerce and culture, should be established and nothing should be left desired as regards its application, by forming a Central Organ under the direct supervision of the Premier and by gathering talented officials from the various Ministries concerned.
4. CHINA is an independent country, but the relation between JAPAN and CHINA is not one of rivalry, but is united as one body in reality, different from that between JAPAN and other countries. Therefore, the pure sphere of diplomacy toward CHINA is very limited. This tendency will hereafter become more and more conspicuous, and, therefore, the Foreign Ministry should apply all its energy to all countries other than CHINA, as it has a lot of work to do as regards them.
5. This situation will, in the long run, come to such a pass that it is necessary for us to consider the overseas territories (especially KOREA) as being within the chain of Sino-Japanese relations, not to speak of MANCHURIA. (It is better for SHANLIN to be transferred to the jurisdiction of the Home Office.) Therefore, the Central Organ shall be developed to such an extent as to abolish the Overseas Ministry and to unite the East Asia Affairs Bureau and the China Cultural Enterprise Bureau of the Foreign Ministry and the MANCHURIAN Affairs Bureau, and conduct matters towards the eventual establishment of a Ministry such as the "East Asia Ministry."

The present-day problem is merely whether we should establish a Ministry immediately or whether we should resign ourselves merely to the formation of a central administrative organ with the object of eventually establishing a special Ministry. (The above is the gist of the explanation made by Councillor HIGASHI.)

Furthermore, there are already many organs in the Cabinet in respect to which there is a tendency to ignore the Premiership as merely a nominal position (as the MANCHURIAN AFFAIRS BUREAU). To let it remain in the status of a bureau in the Cabinet is insufficient, as there is the fear that it may be dragged along by the Army. Therefore, it is necessary for us to create the East Asia Ministry as an independent organ to deal with the situation. The MANCHURIAN AFFAIRS BUREAU should be established as a separate independent bureau, by including the three bureaus, concerning state affairs, (for political guidance towards CHINA) industry (for economic exploitation) and culture (for cultural works towards CHINA) in its system. Furthermore,

SHIN shall be transferred from the Overseas Ministry to the Home Ministry, and an Overseas Bureau (G ICHI KYOKU) or a Bureau of Overseas Affairs (T KUU KYOKU) shall be created by uniting the other bureaus /T.N. of the Overseas Ministry/ as one bureau. All of the affairs in the field of political guidance relating to CHIN except the cultural works toward CHIN shall be transferred from the jurisdiction of the Foreign Ministry, and the Foreign Ministry shall be made to push along towards the perfection of diplomacy and trade (above is the gist of the explanation by Director FUNA).

IV. The above-mentioned plan made by the Bureau of Legislation puts CHIN in the same category as MANCHUKUO from the viewpoint of a colony, and is formed on the basic idea of carrying out various measures accordingly. This not only runs totally counter to the policy of the Imperial Government concerning the counter-measures in dealing with the Sino-Japanese Incident, (decided at the Imperial Council of Jan. 11th), but it also ignores the fact that our diplomacy is based upon CHIN or is making CHIN as its center. It will cause a confrontation with the overseas Foreign Ministry organs by means of establishing the overseas organ of the East Asia Ministry in addition to dividing the diplomacy into the two classes, one relating to CHIN and the other not relating to CHIN, thereby giving rise to disputes about discrimination between genuine and non-genuine diplomacy. As a result of this, it will, both internally and externally, bring about the disruption of the diplomatic organs and friction and clashes between the diplomatic organs which could certainly not be tolerated by people of common sense.

V. Such being the case, the Foreign Ministry has firmly decided to object to it. We are compelled in case such a plan is presented to the Cabinet Council, to request the Foreign Minister to oppose same with firm determination. The senior officials of the Foreign Office had several interviews with Minister HIROTA and they desired him to consider remedies by explaining the situation. They then drew up a concrete plan concerning the competent authorities regarding the national policy companies, which was the main question of the moment, and the Foreign Ministry itself, recognizing the necessity to reflect thoroughly in view of the trend of public opinion, and to draw up a concrete plan, simultaneously planned to re-organize the system of the Foreign Ministry so as to enable it to perform its mission satisfactorily in regard to the three points of its organization, the general re-arrangement of its personnel and the appointment of certain specific persons, based upon the idea of "it must be so" of the organ of overseas diplomatic affairs.

VI. Meanwhile, a so called "draft of Bureau vis-a-vis China," which was supposed to be submitted to the Cabinet Council on the next day, was brought forth to the Legislative Bureau on March 9th. The outline of this draft is as follows. In the first place a bureau of fairly large

scale is to be organized in the Cabinet, which will serve as the foundation for establishing the Ministry of East-Asiatic Affairs. And the following items are intended to be dealt with by it:

- (a) Business bearing on the establishment of the policy towards China (excepting purely diplomatic affairs);
- (b) Business bearing on the maintenance of unified administration toward China by all the Government Offices;
- (c) Study and investigation of the situations of East Asia and the relation between policy to China and international conditions;
- (d) Business bearing on drafting and executing a program of economic development in China;
- (e) Business bearing on economy and communications and its adjustment between Japan, Manchuria and China;
- (f) Business of supervision and control of business of special firms whose purpose is to carry on enterprises in China;
- (g) Business bearing on cultural undertakings in China;
- (h) Drafting bills for the Investigation Committee for China and other general affairs regarding the Committee.

This sort of thing is the practical outcome from the idea that Japan's China policy is not diplomacy. This will incur a disunion of diplomatic organs or friction between diplomatic functions and it is feared it will have a harmful effect upon the future of our nation. Accordingly, an urgent executive meeting of the Planning Committee (with Chairman and other members attending) was held on the same day in order to try to prevent that the draft should be carried in the Cabinet Council. After various opinions were exchanged, the following three items were decided and immediately on the same evening, the whole committee had an interview with Minister HIROTA and prompted him to the same resolution:

1. There ought not to be at all two kinds of diplomatic state policies in our Empire. To preserve the unity of diplomacy is of absolute necessity, especially so in our China policy.

2. The existing organization of the Foreign Ministry is not sufficiently perfect to cope with the present circumstances. Therefore, it is necessary to amplify and strengthen the personnel of the Foreign Ministry by inviting men of ability also from outside of the Ministry.

3. As regards the organ vis-a-vis China, we are opposed to the draft of Bureau vis-a-vis China. All the business towards China must be unified and controlled under the jurisdiction of the Foreign Minister.

The Minister understood the purport thereof and promised us he would oppose the draft of the Bureau vis-a-vis China. And at the same time, he requested us, on the part of the Foreign Ministry, to make up a concrete plan of reorganization to meet the China Problem, as well as to settle in haste the urgent problem concerning which office should supervise the national policy companies.

VII. To this request of the Minister, we answered as follows and got his approval to that effect. We will consider without delay the concrete plans for amplifying and strengthening the organization of the Foreign Ministry. However, for the time being, we insist on establishing a Bureau of Chinese Economic Development Affairs (an Outside Bureau of the Foreign Ministry) as one division in the said amplification and strengthening plan. As for the supervision of the national policy companies, we had better deal with it according to the arrangement which should be made by a conference between the Foreign Minister and Ministers for War, Navy and Finance, and as to its practical business, to make the said Bureau of Development Affairs take it in hand. In this way, a plan to this effect was to be submitted to the Cabinet Council as the counter-plan by the Foreign Ministry against the draft of the Bureau vis-a-vis China, and we handed the bill for Cabinet Council Decision to the Minister. But in consideration of the circumstances of these two plans confronting each other, the Cabinet Council scheduled for the 10th was not held, and on the next day it was postponed, and on the following day, too. In the meantime, the Cabinet side, giving way to the drastic opposition of the Foreign Ministry, limited the problem to the supervising of national policy firms which was of imminent necessity, and changed its attitude to go along with the plan to form a small Bureau (with one Director, three Secretaries and two technical experts) in the Cabinet for the said object and they asked for the Foreign Ministry's approval.

VIII. Towards this, the Foreign Ministry still maintained its opinion regarding the draft regarding its Outside Bureau and did not agree to grant the right of control to the Premier, but by saying "This problem concerning the right of control must be solved by any means at the Cabinet Conference on the 15th day", the Foreign Minister was urged to reconsider this problem, whereupon the Foreign Ministry, thinking that, as far as the problem on the right of Control was concerned, it was not worthwhile bringing about any political trouble, drafted the following bill, and after consultation within the Cabinet, the other party at last consented to the bill at midnight of the 14th and promised that the bill would be decided upon at the Cabinet Council.

1. The business of the National Policy Companies shall be supervised conjointly by the five Ministers, viz. the Premier, the Foreign, the Finance, the War and the Navy Ministers; however, the Premier shall be the competent authority.

2. The joint control shall be exercised in the same way as in the case of the supervision (Imperial Ordinance) of life insurance.

3. To manage this business of control, a Business Control Bureau of National Policy Companies shall be established, and its business shall be strictly limited to controlling the affairs provided by "The purpose of the establishment of the company".

Overseas offices of the Business Control Bureau shall not be established on the spots.

4. The business relating to National Policy Companies of a liaison nature, shall of course be supervised by the Foreign Ministry.

5. Affairs to be brought up for discussion by the Cabinet Deliberation Committee shall be limited to important matters on economical development in CHINA.

6. The executive secretaries of the Cabinet Deliberation Committee shall consist of the Vice-Ministers of the four Ministries (Foreign, Finance, War and Navy) as well as the Vice-President of the Planning Board.

IX. Thus Cabinet Conferences were held on both the 15th and 16th, and the bill was passed at the Cabinet Conference almost entirely in accordance with the spirit of that proposed by the Foreign Ministry; however, only the right of control was formally granted only to the Premier and the Imperial Ordinance on joint control was not issued, and it was decided to write down "The four Ministers agreed with each other on the problem of the right of control at the Cabinet Conference", and thus this problem concerning the right of control became settled for a while.

X. However, the problem about the Organ which was going to be established for managing CHINESE affairs, has not been settled by the above decision. The Cabinet, being forced to submit the National Policy Company bill to the Diet, and attempting to solve by any means the urgent problem concerning the right of control, had merely withdrawn the bill regarding the Bureau for handling CHINESE affairs, and the problem was not only left unsettled, but the discussion regarding the need for establishing the East Asia Ministry as the Central Organ for handling affairs concerning CHINA has sprung up together with the presentation of the National Policy Company bill to the Diet and the problem is still going to be brought into discussion before long, because

the Premier too replied again that the problem was under consideration. The Foreign Ministry has to spontaneously propose a bill able to meet the expectation of the people, because the Foreign Ministry not only made a proposal for establishing an Outside Bureau for economical development in CHINA, but opposed and forced the withdrawal of the bill regarding the Bureau for handling CHINA affairs, under the slogan of "Unification of Diplomatic Organs and Diplomatic Policy".

The public in general do not place much trust in the structure, scale and personnel of the present Foreign Ministry and this was the reason why, the plan for establishing an Outside Bureau in the Foreign Ministry for exploiting CHINA was opposed; so we must plan to reconstruct the system which aims at the essential rearrangement of the structure, scale, and personnel of the Foreign Ministry in order to perform the essential mission of the Foreign Ministry, i.e. the mission of planning and carrying out of the diplomatic policy from a general point of view.

Now the Foreign Ministry is forming a plan which has a special system and aims at the unification of various diplomatic organs so as not to be placed under the restrictions of the Government Organization rules of all the Ministries, because there is an essential difference between the work of other Government Offices and the Foreign Ministry; it is preparing to carry out with able man in the country the diplomatic policy to manage the new Far Eastern questions and to realize a truly unified diplomacy.

Progress of the problem of Central Organ
vis-a-vis CHINA (Part 2)

(Report by Yonezawa, October 20, 1938)

I. Formerly by the advent of the so-called Five Ministers Conferences with UGAKI, the former Minister and IKEDA, the Finance Minister joining the Cabinet, it appeared as if the above would decide various important policies towards CHINA and would actually execute the important parts of the functions of the Central Organ towards CHINA which had been demanded persistently in the past, and the problem of establishing the above central organ towards CHINA therefore seemed temporarily dissolved. But during the latter part of August, it again appeared on the surface and with the purpose of realizing it immediately the Ministers concerned were to present concrete proposals to the Five Minister Conference.

II. This ministry, therefore, considering the surrounding state of affairs, supported willingly the establishment of an organ to be under the supervision of the Premier, and its authority was, under government organization to be limited to adjustment and liaison for each offices.

affairs regarding CHIN. and the supervision of national policy corporations. By a separate decision of the Cabinet the work of this organ was considered to include matters related to the Five Minister Conference and affairs which were then being actually executed by the Third Committee. /Note: This refers to the Third Committee which was established in the Planning Board./ So a draft to the above effect was presented to the Ministers at the Five Minister Conference by Former Minister UG KI.

III. The Military side, however, made light of the Foreign Ministry's proposal because of its scale being too small, especially it being not an executive organ and not meeting the requirements of the time, so it emphasized the necessity of facing the state of affairs with all brains mobilized and that it must be an organ which would take charge of the execution of policies established for politics, economics and culture. Its authority should be (1) establishment of various measures towards CHIN; (2) political and economical cooperation towards a new government in CHINA; (3) investigation, planning and execution in reference to political and economical matters in CHINA; (4) welfare and cultural undertakings in CHINA; (5) supervision of national policy companies; (6) unification and maintenance of the administration of each office towards CHINA.

A proposal of this purport was presented under the name of Draft for CHIN. Board by the War Minister on September 6th to the Five Minister Conference.

IV. Since the central organ was made an executive office, it was quite natural for there to be a necessity for a complete organization of functions of local organs in all matters under its jurisdiction. In the above draft by the Army, making the CHIN. Board an executive office, as to the local organs, fearing the opposition by the local Special Service Agencies at the spot, they were restricted to organs dealing with economy (in the draft of the last decade of September Culture also was added). The political matters were left in the hands of the Special Service Agencies, and looking from the standpoint of a unified organ it lacked perfection. Besides, the CHIN. Affairs Board when considered not as a temporary organ during the Incident, but as a minimum basic permanent organ (organs of this sort are necessary in continuing the Japanese hold on CHINA even after the recognition of the new CHINESE Central Government) which was likely to keep under control the relation of both countries after the readjustment of Japanese and CHINESE diplomatic relations, and having the authority to establish a policy, would have a so-called national politic nature and it was greatly feared that there was a danger that might make the Five Minister Conferences mere robots.

V. This Ministry, therefore, seeing that no hope at all could be entertained of accomplishing the original proposal with the urgency of

the circumstances, decided not to be persistent about it, and on this occasion based itself upon the fundamental idea that (1) political disturbances should not be created because of the question of structure; and (2) the general character of diplomacy and unified maintenance of the diplomatic system should not be impaired, and consider these two conditions to be co-existent. In consequence, (1) the political, economic and cultural matters which are being executed by the Special Service Agencies and others are to be simultaneously transferred en bloc to the local organ of the CHINA Affairs Board. (This point was strongly upheld by the Navy also.) (2) The China Affairs Board is to be a temporary organ during the Incident and in case of the adjustment of relation between Japan and China an organ corresponding to the then situation is to be considered anew. (3) To agree to the proposal to make the China Affairs Board an executive organ on condition that the so-called "policies" in "the task to establish policies to be under the authority of the Board" shall be limited to those of secondary importance and all important policies vis-a-vis China, to say nothing of the basic measures relating to the saving of the situation shall be entrusted to the Five Ministers Conference, and at the same time the area that is within the authority of the Board shall be limited to the occupied regions on the ground that it does not necessarily hurt the unity of diplomacy to admit the execution of policies and administration by a specially established organ in the present condition when the occupied area can be compared to areas under military administration and there exist no diplomatic relations with the new regime. Arriving at the above plan, former Foreign Minister UGAKI proposed it to the Five Minister Conference.

VI. However, concerning the plan, the Ministers of War and Navy agreed with the making of the Board a temporary organ but flatly opposed to the limitation of the area under its authority to the occupied zones, earnestly asserting that this limitation can only be made by disregarding the fact that we are fighting a great war with China and that it is the mission of the Board to practice concurrently the two tasks of construction and destruction against whole China aiming at the overthrow of CHIANG KAI SHEK. Thus the two plans being in complete opposition to each other, it was decided to put off the Five Minister Conference to the next day in a state of deadlock. At that time already all hopes of tiding over the deadlock by political negotiations were lost and the situation became so bad that the former Minister UGAKI seemed to have made up his mind to a certain extent in regard to the unfavourable situation and merely remarked that he had no objection to attempt a business-like settlement in compliance with the wishes of the business authorities, if there should be any hopes for the said settlement.

VII. Thus the negotiations between the two authorities began, but the militaristic side (the Navy also wholly supported the Army) opposed

fundamentally the occupied area plan although it agreed in general to the opinion (refer to foregoing Clause V) of the Foreign Ministry except for the question of the occupied area. As it revealed its determination to persistently push through the "Whole of China" plan asserting that, to be in the state of war means the non-existence of diplomatic relations and that it is not only wrong to discriminate the occupied zone from the non-occupied zone, but that the restriction of zones is inconsistent with the mission of the China Board, an agreement was made at last on the temporary concession of the occupied area plan on the condition that the Foreign Minister would agree, considering that the possibility of regarding whole China as an occupied area would eliminate the objection. A settlement was made to express this purport by finding adequate phraseology in order to clarify still more that the existence of the Board is based upon the abnormal relation between Japan and China and the business under its authority shall be colored with the tint of urgency.

VIII. Meanwhile, the Government hoped for an amicable settlement of the problem by postponing the Conference a day and a half, but when the above compromise of the business authorities was explained to the former Minister UGAKI on the morning of the 29th, the said Minister said, "Indeed I admit that there exists no diplomatic relation to non-occupied areas as well as to occupied areas in this day of war and the Government announced that we would not deal with the CHIANG KAI SHEK regime, but there should be no objection in dealing with the Chinese people, so that it is necessary to leave some room for diplomatic measures. I hope that you will leave the entire matter to me. I have a certain determination". So saying he at once visited Premier KONOYE and tendered his resignation after explaining that he could not bear the responsibility as Foreign Minister for the "Whole China" plan.

IX. Thus, through the concurrent service of the Premier as Foreign Minister, it was decided to immediately advance along the line of the mediation plan of the authorities concerned. The Foreign Ministry insisted strongly on correcting the words and phrases of the draft of "The Outline of Decisions of the Cabinet Conference", as well as the draft of the "Matters for Understanding" in order to make the necessary restriction in regard to the real character and authority of the China Board. They succeeded in carrying this out. Those which passed the Five Ministers' Conferences and the Cabinet meeting are as described in Appendix A and B. Articles 5 and 6 of Appendix B are considered as "Matters of Understanding of the Five Ministers' Conference," and were not written down as "Matters of Understanding of the Cabinet Conference" in view of the delicate relation between the Five Ministers' Conference and the Cabinet Conference.

X. The Bureau of Legislation is at present drafting and adjusting the plan of organization, but the final decision has not yet been reached.

as to the detail of the work to be transferred from the ministries concerned. Especially, in connection with the Foreign Ministry they seem to be perplexed because of insufficient knowledge of the work of the overseas offices of the East Asia Bureau, the Bureau of Commercial Affairs, the Information Bureau, to say nothing of the cultural project (under discussion whether the whole part is to be transferred or whether it is to be restricted to only the part which has relation to the incident). We are at present making detailed explanations but as far as we are concerned we are giving careful consideration to the details of the work to be transferred from other ministries to the China Board since we believe that the essential mission of the China Board lies in synthetically planning and carrying out works which are necessary to settle the present Incident making it a temporary organization during the Incident.

Outline of the Establishment
of the China Affairs Board.

(Decision of the Cabinet conference,
October 1, 1938)

- I. During the CHINA Incident, a central organ vis-a-vis China, called the China Board will be established, with the Prime Minister as its president and the Ministers of the Foreign Affairs, Finance, War and Navy Ministries as vice-presidents.
- II. The matters to be charged to this organization are as follows, but matters which have relations to other countries are excluded.
 1. Work relating to government economy, and culture which must be settled in CHINA during the CHINA Incident.
 2. Work concerning the establishment of various policies relating to the matters described in the foregoing clause.
 3. Work relating to the supervision of the business of companies which were established under special laws enacted in order to carry on business in CHINA, as well as the supervision of the business of companies which aim to carry on business in CHINA.
 4. Work relating to the maintenance of unity of administrative affairs of all ministries which have relation to CHINA.
- III. Liaison Committee will be placed in the China Affairs Board in order to keep all offices concerned in touch with important matters relating to the work described in the foregoing clause.

IV. Its local organs of the China Board, China Bureau's (temporary name) will be established in important local places.

V. A China Committee will be established in order to investigate and examine important matters among the work under the authority of the China Affairs Board and be able to submit important proposals to the President, in response to his inquiries.

able and learned civilians are to be made members of this Committee so as to represent a national public opinion.

No. B

(Oct. 1, 1938)

Understanding at Cabinet Conference

The establishment of the CHINA Affairs Board shall be based on the following understanding:

1. Simultaneously with the establishment of the CHINA Affairs Board its overseas organs shall be installed.
2. The overseas organs of the CHINA Affairs Board shall, upon being installed, engage in work under its administration for the whole of politics, economics and culture. Therefore, the military special organs and others shall transfer all these duties to the overseas organs upon the latter's establishment.
3. Special consideration shall be given to the relation between the local Army and Navy, and the overseas organs of the CHINA Affairs Board as regards the preservation of public peace and order.
4. The President of the CHINA Affairs Board shall consult in advance with the Foreign Minister about matters relating to liaison affairs (relating to Third Powers) among the duties under the jurisdiction of the CHINA Affairs Board.
5. As regards "work on establishment of various policies" stipulated in Item 2 of matters under the jurisdiction of the CHINA Affairs Board, all the original policies for China shall be determined by the Ministers concerned, that is at the so-called Five Ministers' Conferences. It is the duty of the CHINA Affairs Board to formulate its plans based on the decisions at the Five Ministers' Conference relating to policies described in Item No. 2 in regard to matters under the Board's jurisdiction and to set up their concrete practical plans based on the policies determined at the Five Ministers' Conferences.
6. Fundamental policies regarding the adjustment of the situation shall be decided chiefly at the Five Ministers' Conferences. The work or duties accompanying the execution of the above will be chiefly handled by the Four Ministers, namely the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Finance, War and Navy.